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IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND P~uc POLICY. By Neal K. Komesar. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press. 1994. Pp. xi, 287. $ 34.95. 
According to a standard history of American legal thought, in 
the 1930s and 40s a generation of thinkers broke down the reigning 
analytical structure of the law - legal formalism - that conceived 
of law as a science that decided cases by deducing conclusions from 
authoritative premises.1 The legal process school emerged as for-
malism's chief contender and soon took its place as the dominant 
school of legal thought. The advocates of this new thinking rallied 
around a few central ideas, including law as social policy, and the 
importance of institutional competence. As two commentators re-
cently noted,2 the school produced legal classics, such as Hart and 
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 3 Lon Fuller's 
"Forms and Limits of Adjudication,"4 and, most importantly, Hart 
and Sacks's unfinished and long-unpublished teaching materials en-
titled The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Appli-
cation of Law.5 In the 1960s and 70s, however, social divisions such 
as the civil rights and women's movements and sudden economic 
insecurity undermined this legal consensus, and "the socio-political 
conditions for the legal process synthesis ended."6 
1. See MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 1870-1960, at 109-
212 (1992); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADmoN 154-77 (1988). Pro-
fessor Arthur A. Leff has provided an "intellectual parod[y]" of this history: 
Once upon a time there was Fonnalism. The law itself was a deductive 'system, with 
unquestionable premises leading to ineluctable conclusions .... The job of legal com-
mentators ..• was to find the consistent thread in the inconsistent statements of others 
and pull it all together along the seam of what was implicit in "the logic of the system." 
Arthur A. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 VA. L. 
REV. 451, 453 (1974). Joseph Beale summed up the fonnalist approach in stating that "law 
.•. is not a mere collection of arbitrary rules, but a body of scientific principles [that] in great 
part •.. consists in a homogeneous, scientific and all-embracing body of principle." JOSEPH 
BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 24-25 (1935), quoted in Leff, supra, at 459. 
2. William Eskridge & Philip Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107 HARv. L. 
REv. 2031, 2048-49 (1994). 
3. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FED-
ERAL SYSTEM (1953). 
4. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353 (1978) 
(revision of the draft originally prepared in 1956-57). 
5. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 
1994) (tent. ed. 1958). The legal process school takes its name from Hart and Sacks's work. 
6. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 2051 ("In the •.. 1970s, the halls of Harvard Law 
School during Sacks's tenure as dean echoed with faculty announcements that 'legal process 
is dead."'). 
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Legal process is back. Last year, in "one of the most unusual 
decisions in the history of legal publishing,"7 Foundation Press pub-
lished the 1958 "tentative edition" of Hart and Sacks's canonical 
work.8 In an article discussing its publication after a thirty-five year 
delay, the new editors of The Legal Process, Professors William Es-
kridge and Philip Frickey, argue that "the legal process philosophy 
is, in some respects, even more productive today than it was in the 
1950s .... [N]ew positive theories of political institutions ... suggest 
more sophisticated ways of thinking about the different competen-
cies of institutions and about the dynamics of their relationships -
in other words, a more sophisticated Hart-and-Sacks analysis ... . "9 
The editors observe that former students of the legal process 
school, such as Justice Stephen Breyer and Judge Richard Posner, 
have applied their learning to new legal issues in administrative law, 
constitutional law, and statutory interpretation.10 Moreover, a new 
generation of legal-process theorists - including Judge Guido Cal-
abresi, and Eskridge and Frickey themselves - have been inspired 
to revive the study of statutory interpretation.11 Eskridge and 
Frickey end their article with a challenge: 
If institutions are central to law's unfolding, is it not our responsibility 
to develop theories of comparative institutional legitimacy and effi-
cacy? Hart and Sacks posed good questions. Their would-be heirs in 
the 1990s face the challenge of answering those questions as well as 
the new ones posed by the critics of the legal process.12 
Professor Neal K. Komesar13 has taken up the challenge. His 
book, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Eco-
nomics, and Public Policy, offers an elegant and encyclopedic argu-
ment for the necessity of comparing institutions when making law 
and public policy.14 He drills home his message with messianic zeal: 
any decision about law or public policy depends not only on a set of 
values or goals that we want to achieve, but also on an evaluation as 
7. Id. at 2031. 
8. HART & ALBERT, supra note 5. 
9. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 2053. 
10. Id. at 2052 (citing, among others, STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 
346-68 (1982); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-93 
(1985)). 
11. Id. (citing, among others, GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR TIIE AGE OF 
STATUTES 87-90 (1982); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 11 
CAL. L. REv. 919, 919-20 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (1988))). 
12. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 2055. 
13. James E. and Ruth B. Doyle-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. 
14. Komesar briefly discusses The Legal Process as one of "three major works on institu-
tional choice •.. requir[ing] comparison to my approach." P. 11. He distinguishes Hart and 
Sacks's work as "significantly different from mine. [1bey] presented a largely idealized im-
age of institutions .••. [T]heir conception of institutional behavior assumes away most of the 
difficulty and richness of institutional choice." P. 12. 
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to which institution - the market, the courts, or the political sys-
tem - can best achieve such values or goals. To this end, 
Komesar's book presents and applies a theory of how to compare 
institutions. 
The breadth of Komesar's project is striking. In making his ar-
gument and presenting his theory, he reprimands countless promi-
nent legal thinkers for their failure to compare institutions. The list 
of Komesar's targets reads like a "Who's Who" of constitutional 
and law and economics scholarship. His book finds failures of insti-
tutional analysis in John Rawls's Theory of Justice,1s Richard Pos-
ner's Economic Analysis of Law, 16 John Hart Ely's Democracy and 
Distrust,11 Richard Epstein's Takings,18 Cass Sunstein's analysis of 
constitutional protection against rent seeking,19 and Bruce Acker-
man's criticism2o of the famous Carolene Products footnote four.21 
He also takes minor jabs at Guido Calabresi and Douglas Me-
lamed's analysis of the choice between property and liability rules,22 
Calabresi's A Common Law for the Age of Statutes,23 and Laurence 
Tribe's antiprocess view of constitutional law.24 On the law and ec-
onomics front, Komesar criticizes Patricia Danzon's proposed 
schedule of pain-and-suffering damages in tort,25 Alan Schwartz's 
recommendation for administrative fines in place of reduced dam-
ages to obtain accident deterrence,26 and W. Kip Viscusi's prefer-
ence for administrative over tort regulation of product design 
defects.27 Moreover, Komesar indicts whole schools of thought -
originalist (pp. 262-65) and fyndamental-rights approaches (pp. 
\ 
15. Pp. 34-44 {discussing JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY oF JurnCE (1971)). ' 
16. Pp. 17-22, 157-61 {discussing RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw {4th 
ed. 1992)). 
17. Pp. 198-215 {discussing JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST {1980)). 
18. Pp. 235-44 (discussing RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS {1985)). 
19. Pp. 217-21 {discussing Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 
STAN. L. REv. 29 {1985)). 
20. Pp. 221-30 {discussing Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 989 HARv. L. 
REv. 713 (1985)). 
21. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
22. P. 22 n.17 (discussing Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1098 {1972)). 
23. P. 137 n.13 (discussing Gumo CALABRESI, A CoMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STAT-
UTES (1982)). 
24. P. 215 & n.37 (discussing Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based 
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980)). 
25. Pp. 179-80 (discussing Patricia Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in 
Private Markets, 13 J. LEGAL Sruo. 517 {1984)). 
26. Pp. 180-81 {discussing Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A 
Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 371-84 (1988)). 
27. P. 180 n.49 {discussing W. Kn> VIscus1, REFORMING PRooucrs LIABILITY 128 
(1991)). . 
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256-61) to constitutional judicial review and interest-group political 
theory (pp. 216-21) - as wrongheaded or incomplete. 
What is all the fuss about? According to Komesar, these think-
ers have fundamentally missed the boat by failing to analyze the 
institutions that make and apply law.28 First, the worst sinners sim-
ply ignore the all-important question of "Who Decides?" The big 
target in this group is Rawls. According to Komesar, Rawls's The-
ory of Justicew merely articulates and ranks principles of liberty and 
equality, and '~focuses virtually no attention on real world institu-
tions and institutional choice" (p. 37). Komesar argues that such an 
"etherial and arid" worldview (p. 39) proves useless for lawmaking 
because justice requires not only the ordering of values, but also 
"the presence of institutions capable of translating high-sounding 
principles into substance" (p. 41). When a theory like Rawls's con-
tains "such loosely defined elements and complicated standards ... 
the character of the institutions that will define and apply these 
goals becomes an essential - perhaps the essential - component 
in the realization of the just society.''30 
Second, Komesar assails well-known legal scholars as suffering 
from the defect he calls "single institutionalism" (p. 6). According 
to Komesar, these scholars rightly evaluate the competence of a 
particular institution like the market, the courts, or the political sys-
tem, but they myopically ignore the alternatives. For example, 
Komesar argues that Richard Posner's analysis of the common law, 
with its exclusive focus on how well markets work, is "single institu-
tional" rather than "comparative institutional" (p. 20). He points 
out that Posner's choice between markets, via a property rule, and 
courts, via a liability rule, as the institution that can most efficiently 
resolve the problem of local pollution turns solely on the market's 
varying ability to accommodate transactions (pp. 20-22). For Pos-
28. Regarding constitutional judicial review, Komesar goes so far as to say that "scholars 
and judges must accept the difficult task of.institutional choice •..• Any analysis that does 
not centrally focus on this task is largely useless." P. 270. 
29. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
30. P. 42. Komesar writes further that "UJust societies are based not on the announce-
ment of broad principles but on the design of real world institutional decision-making 
processes and the designation of which process will decide which issues." Pp. 48-49. To 
illustrate this flaw in Rawls's theory, Komesar attempts to apply Rawls's principle of ordered 
liberty to the real-world dilemma presented by the Pentagon Papers case. Pp. 42-49 (discuss-
ing New York Tunes Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)). In this case, the federal 
government brought an action to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from 
publishing a top-secret Defense Department study of the Vietnam War, claiming that such 
publication would endanger national security. By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court refused 
the injunction. Komesar claims that the nine Justices' radically different opinions all share 
Rawls's goal of "the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a 
similar system of liberty for all." P. 43. They differ, however, in their assumptions about 
which institution best achieves this balance of liberties - some preferring an absolutist un-
regulated marketplace of ideas, others trusting either the courts or the political process to 
best determine the balance of liberty and order. Pp. 45-49. 
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ner, "where. the market works, the courts allocate the ... balancing 
of costs and benefits[ ] to the market; where the market does not 
work, the courts make the efficiency determination themselves" (p. 
19). To Komesar, such analysis is incomplete: 
If the issue involves two institutions - the market and the courts -
then why does Posner only ask about variations in the ability of the 
market? ... 
. . . [O]ur question is not whether market performance improves 
· or deteriorates with larger numbers of parties, but rather whether the 
market works better or worse than the courts.31 
Komesar observes that the same factors that cause market perform-
ance to deteriorate may also impede the functioning of courts, mak-
ing our choice between the two institutions much more difficult 
than Posner recognizes (pp. 21-28). 
Komesar criticizes John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust32 as 
suffering from a comparable tunnel vision: "Like Posner's analysis 
of the common law, Ely's analysis of constitutional law is single in-
stitutional, relying largely · on variation in political malfunction" 
rather than comparing the varying abilities of the political and judi-
cial processes (p. 199; emphasis added). 
Although Komesar's exhaustive critique of such single-institu-
tional and noninstitutional analyses occupies a large part of his 
book, he also offers and applies his own affirmative theory of how 
to compare institutions. Komesar presents this argument in six 
parts. First, he analyzes the three institutions at issue: the political 
process, the market, and the courts. He then applies this under-
standing of institutions to three legal issues: tort reform, constitu-
tion making, and constitutional judicial review. 
31. Pp. 20-21. Similarly, Posner's analysis of which institution should establish the effi-
cient standard of care in negligence law solely focuses on the varying ability of the market. 
Posner argues that the market, which establishes its standard through custom, rather than the 
judicial process, should set the standard of care where plaintiffs and defendants can allocate 
the costs of accidents between themselves through market interactions. From his vantage 
point, Posner finds himself at a loss to explain the holding in a well-known custom case, The 
T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.1932), in which Judge Learned Hand affirmed a negligence 
decision for a plaintiff even though the defendant and plaintiff were in a market relationship 
and the defendant's standard of care complied with custom. P. 159. Komesar explains Judge 
Hand's holding in T.J. Hooper as not just an evaluation of the market's varying ability to set 
the standard of care but also as a comparison with the alternative: judges and juries' varying 
competence to set care standards. Pp. 159-60. Unlike medical malpractice cases, which often 
present a jury with complex technical questions beyond its competence, T.J. Hooper involved 
the relatively simple question of whether a tug-owner was negligent in failing to have a radio 
on board to warn against an impending storm. Pp. 160-61. Thus Komesar notes that the 
difference between Judges Posner and Hand "may stem from their implicit institutional pre-
sumptions or default positions. To Posner, if the market works relatively well, the market 
gets the job. To Hand, if the courts work relatively well, the courts get the job (or, more 
accurately, retain the job)." P. 161 n.16. 
32. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
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According to Komesar's theory of comparative institutional 
analysis, which he terms the "participation-centered approach," an 
institution's competence depends on the participation of the institu-
tional actors within it (p. 7). Komesar claims that "the actions of 
the mass of participants ... best accounts for the variation in how 
institutions function. In this sense, the adjudicative and political 
processes are like the market, with its myriad of buyers and sellers" 
(p. 7). Drawing upon his law and economics background, 
Komesar's participation-centered theory examines the costs and 
benefits to individuals of participating in each institution. 
Komesar relies upon the celebrated insights of two scholars, 
Mancur Olson and Ronald Coase, to elaborate upon these costs 
and benefits.33 Regarding benefits, Komesar takes from Olson's 
work on collective action34 the importance of "the distribution of 
stakes" - the average per capita benefit derived from institutional 
participation and the variance of this benefit across the population 
of beneficiaries. Following Coase,35 Komesar portrays the costs of 
institutional participation - including transaction costs, litigation 
costs, and political participation costs - as the costs of information 
and organization. Chapters Three, Four, and Five apply this cost-
benefit framework to describe the workings of three institutions: 
the political process, the market, and the courts. 
Komesar's discussion of the political process synthesizes the in-
sights of previous scholars to introduce a new way of thinking about 
the functioning of legislatures that he calls the "two-force model" 
(p. 53). Komesar begins by introducing the prominent position in 
current legal scholarship of the "interest group theory of politics" 
(p. 53). Derived from the Nobel-prize-winning work of economists 
George Stigler and James Buchanan,36 this theory asserts that 
small, concentrated interest groups are often able to exert a dispro-
portionate influence over the political process - obtaining legisla-
tion or regulation even though the gains to the interest group are 
less than the losses imposed on the dispersed majority. A classic 
33. Komesar candidly acknowledges his intellectual debt to Olson and Coase. He writes: 
Nothing is new or startling about the participation-centered approach. Ronald Coase's 
transaction cost approach ... emphasized the cost of information in understanding insti-
tutional activity .... The emphasis on the distribution of stakes can be traced to Mancur 
Olson's work on collective action. That this analysis is simple and its components well 
known are major advantages •.. for my purposes. An analytical framework meant to 
serve so vast a range of possible investigations ••. must be as simple, accessible, and 
intuitively sensible as possible. 
P. 8; citations omitted. 
34. MANcUR OLSON, THE Lome OF CoLI.ECilVE ACilON (1965), cited at p. 8 n.3. 
35. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNOMICA 386 (1937), cited at p. 8 n.2; 
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcqN. 1 (1960), cited at p. 8 n.2. 
36. See pp. 53-58 (discussing TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKINO SOCIETY (James 
Buchanan et al. eds., 1980); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. 
EcoN. & MoMT. Scr. 3 (1971)). 
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example is the imposition of a protective tariff that benefits a small 
cadre of producers to the detriment of a larger group of consumers. 
Komesar refers to this phenomenon, variously known as capture 
theory, special interest theory, or interest group theory, as "mi-
noritarian bias" (p. 56). 
Komesar argues that current scholars' preoccupation with such 
minoritarian bias37 obscures an arguably more severe malfunction 
in the political process - majoritarian bias (p. 67). Such "tyranny 
of the majority" is the countervailing force whereby a larger group 
imposes disproportionately high costs on a smaller group. In addi-
tion to the obvious historical examples involving mistreatment of 
racial minorities - slavery, Jim Crow laws, and the internment of 
Japanese Americans during World War II - Komesar cites local 
zoning ordinances as frequent examples of majoritarian bias (p. 81). 
The existence of both forms of bias makes it very difficult to 
predict which type of political malfunction will occur - more so 
than the theorists who concentrate solely on one form of bias may 
think. Komesar's theory, like most current scholarship, predicts 
that minoritarian bias will prove the more frequent problem, be-
cause small, concentrated interest groups often can gain great bene-
fits at reduced costs of information-gathering and organization. But 
Komesar also enumerates the factors that make majoritarian bias 
more probable: increases in "the absolute per capita stakes of the 
majority, the non-uniformity of distribution (which affects the pos-
sibility of entrepreneurship), [and] the size of the majority[;]" as 
well as reductions in "the comple:Xity of the issue, and the cost of 
information" (p. 88). Komesar concludes that although it is likely 
that minoritarian bias is a more common problem, "the severity of 
majoritarian bias - its total impact on society - may rival that of 
minoritarian bias" (p. 81). 
Komesar's discussion of markets in Chapter Four, although in-
teresting in its own right, adds little to the book. After reciting 
Coase's renowned insight into the importance of transaction costs, 
Komesar insists on the parallel significance of transaction benefits. 
Chapter Four further provides a primer on various forms of market 
failure, explains the necessity of a stable political process to support 
a well-functioning market, and concludes with a comparison of rent 
seeking in the market and the political process. Because his volu-
minous real-world applications make no arguments for or against 
the market choice, Komesar's discussion of markets is probably the 
least interesting part of his book. 
37. As examples of legal scholars who have applied interest-group theory to issues in 
constitutional law and statutory interpretation, Komesar refers to, among others, Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Richard Epstein, Cass Sunstein, Frank Easterbrook, and Jonathan Macey. See 
p. 216 n.38. 
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Chapter Five specifies the unique traits of the judicial process, 
and thereby sets the stage for the transition to Komesar's most en-
gaging argument. In this chapter, Komesar contends that courts -
as compared to the political and market processes - have three 
distinct structural attributes. First, formal and costly requirements, 
such as justiciability, jurisdiction, pleading, and discovery proce-
dures, govern participation in the courts, limit the information 
judges and juries receive, and constrain the judges' ability to initiate 
decisionmaking. Second, judges and juries are far more independ-
ent than their market or political counterparts: judges generally re-
ceive autonomy-enhancing employment benefits such as life tenure, 
while juries are one-shot decisionmakers walled off from outside 
influence. Finally, compared to markets and political systems, 
courts have a very limited reach. Komesar concludes that these 
unique features demand that judges carefully husband the limited 
resources of adjudication, "by substituting adjudicative decision-
making for political decision-making or market decision-making 
only when the balance of bias, competence, and scale favors that 
substitution" (p. 150). 
Komesar's most comprehensive and intriguing argument follows 
in Chapter Six: He argues that the characteristics of certain private 
tort claims do in fact require a substitution of judicial for political 
decisionmaking. Applying his participation-centered approach to 
the issue of tort reform, Komesar argues that the distribution of 
costs and benefits in tort cases involving products and services 
strongly favors the institution of judicial decisionmaking. Komesar 
analyzes the distribution of stakes among four groups: actual and 
potential injurers and actual and potential victims. He argues that 
because products and services cases involve a fairly small number of 
"high-stakes" potential injurers who will face high-cost lawsuits, as 
well as a fairly small number of "high-stakes" actual victims who 
will sustain high-cost damages,38 there exists a particularly strong 
possibility that adjudication of these tort claims can deter accidents. 
The victims have strong incentives to bring tort suits, and the injur-
ers have strong incentives to learn how to decrease accidents.39 
38. The potential victims do not have high stakes. Before an accident occurs there exists a 
large number of potential victims, the vast majority of whom will not suffer an accident. 
Only after the accident does the actual victim sustain the concentrated, high-stakes costs of 
damages. 
39. Komesar compares two other possible distributions, involving "low-stakes" potential 
injurers and "low-stakes" actual victims. The first group appears in cases in which a much 
larger number of dispersed potential injurers exists, such as automobile accident cases. The 
second group appears in cases in which a much larger number of small dispersed injuries 
occurs, such as minor pollution cases. In cases involving these two groups, the possibility of 
effective deterrence decreases because the low-stakes potential injurers lack the incentive to 
incur the costs of learning how to decrease accidents, and the low-stakes actual victims lack 
the incentive to incur the information-gathering and organization costs required to bring suit 
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As Komesar points out, this distribution of stakes also makes 
such cases particularly poor candidates for effective political con-
trol. Although the actual victims have high stakes, the potential vic-
tims do not.40 Thus, potential victims have little incentive to 
participate in the political process especially relative to the high-
stakes potential injurers. Komesar writes "[t]his overrepresentation 
has all the elements of minoritarian bias" (p. 192). He concludes: 
"The tort reform process is biased. Even if some tort reform is nec-
essary, the biased political process ... is likely to go much farther 
than it should" (p. 192). These findings lead Komesar to recom-
mend that courts substitute for the political process either by con-
struing reform statutes narrowly or by invalidating them through 
constitutional review (p. 193). He notes with satisfaction that a 
great number of courts have already done so (p. 193). 
Chapters Seven and Eight explore the institutional implications 
of constitution making and constitutional judicial review. They crit-
icize, from an institutional perspective, various constitutional law 
theories, including interest-group political theory, originalist and 
fundamental-rights approaches to judicial review, and the theories 
contained in Ely's Democracy and Distrust, 41 and Epstein's 
Takings. 42 
Komesar concludes his book by summarizing in rule-like form 
its three main "Propositions" - that goal or value choice alone is 
insufficient; that institutional analysis must be comparative; and 
that it also must be participation-centered. 
Given the breadth of Komesar's analysis, it is important to rec-
ognize certain points and distinctions that he does not make. First, 
Komesar largely ignores the institutional choice between the mar-
ket and the political process. In so doing, he avoids the interesting 
debates over the comparative merits of various forms of regulated 
and unregulated markets. As Komesar admits, his account concen-
trates on the question of when courts should substitute their judg-
ments for those of the political process (p. 273). 
Secondly, unlike Hart and Sacks for example, Komesar never 
explicitly analyzes the administrative process as a distinct institu-
tion. Although he does compare administrative agencies to juries 
(pp. 138-42), he does not treat such agencies as a separate branch 
worthy of its own participation-centered analysis. Rather he lumps 
the bureaucracy with the legislature under the rubric of "the polit-
ical process." This seems unfortunate, given the likelihood that the 
against the injurer. Pp. 161-70. Thus, the distribution of stakes discussed in the text com-
pares favorably with these two. 
40. See discussion supra note 38. 
41. ELY, supra note 32. 
42. RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985). 
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manner of participation in these two institutions differs. Such an 
analysis also ignores the interesting issues surrounding the relation-
ship between courts and agencies that stands at the heart of admin-
istrative law. 
Thirdly, Komesar essentially ignores the federalist dimension of 
institutions. Komesar especially slights the institutional distinctions 
of the state courts. More specifically, his discussion of judicial inde-
pendence rests on an implicit assumption of Article III safeguards. 
Also, his discussion of the role of courts focuses on constitutional 
review and statutory interpretation and fails to elaborate on the in-
stitutional dimensions of common-law policymaking.43 
Ultimately, despite the breadth and sweeping goals of 
Komesar's project,44 his book provides only a preliminary analysis. 
For example, although he presents detailed criticisms of faulty 
single-institutional and noninstitutional analyses - namely, Pos-
ner's ideas on local pollution and the application of Rawls's theory 
to the Pentagon Papers case - Komesar never concludes which in-
stitution should be preferred in either case. His general pattern is 
to criticize earlier analyses, vehemently advocate for a comparative 
institutional approach, and demur on the results of this approach.45 
But even this criticism is not fully justified. Komesar does offer 
two specific conclusions - he supports the institution of judicial 
decision in tort reform and he rejects Richard Epstein's expansive 
version of the Takings Clause. Moreover, he presents his book as a 
blueprint outlining general principles for future analysts, and he ac-
knowledges that the analysis he describes will prove difficult and 
will often produce uncertain answers.46 In the end, his elegant and 
accessible book has accomplished a difficult task. It emphasizes the 
distinction between public values and the institutions we choose to 
43. This may simply be an outgrowth of his Jack of interest in the institutional choice 
between markets and regulation, which can be characterized as the choice between common-
Jaw property and liability rules. Komesar does, however, discuss such issues in his criticism of 
Judge Posner's analysis of local pollution problems. Pp. 14-28. 
44. He begins the book by stating: "My aim in this book is to recast the analysis of law 
and public policy .... " P. ix. He closes it by affirming: "My ultimate goal is to aid the 
refonnation of society." P. 274. 
45. Moreover, at several points in the book, Komesar explicitly puts off difficult questions 
of application, noting, for example: "In these examples and others . • • , there are some 
nascent lessons for constitution making in general. The challenge of developing these lessons 
will have to await future work." P. 231. "I will leave to another day or, hopefully, another 
author, the task of thoroughly developing a comparative institutional analysis of statutory 
interpretation." P. 194 n.77. He even equivocates on the issue of judicial review of tort 
refonn statutes: "[T]he issue of whether and to what extent tort refonn decisions should be 
reviewed by the courts is one I will save for another day. It is too complex and too volatile to 
be handled as an aside here." P. 195. 
46. Komesar concludes by observing that his "participation-centered approach .•• is [no] 
more than a rope bridge across the chasm of institutional choice. Much more must be done 
and the work promises to be frustratingly slow and difficult •••• [But i]f I have done my job, 
[other] analysts will now carry forward the task." Pp. 275-56. 
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achieve them, and it usefully investigates the ways these different 
instituitons can fail. As his numerous examples illustrate, the task 
of comparing institutions is all too easy to overlook or perform 
poorly. This powerful reminder about the importance of compara-
tive institutional competence will only enrich the study of law and 
public policy. 
- David A. Luigs 
